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CONTEMPLATING WHEN EQUITABLE SERVITUDES RUN WITH 
THE LAND 
ALFRED L. BROPHY* 
Equitable servitudes present some of the most difficult problems in 
property law for students (and judges).  Determining whether subsequent 
purchasers from a promisor are bound by the servitudes—and whether 
subsequent purchasers from the promisee are able to enforce the 
requirements—are particularly elusive problems.  The hornbook law on 
equitable servitudes is that they run if there is (1) intent for them to run, (2) 
notice, and (3) they “touch and concern” the land.1  The first two are easy to 
figure out; the latter is much harder.  The requirement that servitudes “touch 
and concern” the land is often a stand-in for qualitative judgments about 
whether the servitude should run with the land.  As a result, judgments about 
“touch and concern” are made difficult because they are masking other 
decisions. 
Typically, servitudes are said to touch and concern the land when they 
affect the legal relations of the parties in relation to land.  Judge Clark has 
stated that 
[i]f the promisor’s legal relations in respect to the land in question are 
lessened—his legal interest as owner rendered less valuable by the promise—
the burden of the covenant touches or concerns that land; if the promisee’s 
legal relations in respect to that land are increased—his legal interest as owner 
rendered more valuable by the promise—the benefit of the covenant touches or 
concerns that land.2 
That test has a seeming circularity about it,3 although it has substantial 
adherents.4 
 
* Professor of Law, University of Alabama.  I would like to thank Mary Sarah Bilder and 
Kimberly E. Dean for their comments and Dedi Felman for teaching me about Frank Lloyd 
Wright. 
 1. JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER, INTRODUCTION TO PROPERTY 226 (2001). 
 2. CHARLES E. CLARK, REAL COVENANTS AND OTHER INTERESTS WHICH “RUN WITH THE 
LAND” 97 (2d ed. 1947). 
 3. Lawrence Berger, A Policy Analysis of Promises Respecting the Use of Land, 55 MINN. 
L. REV. 167, 211 (1970) (suggesting the test is circular); JESSE DUKEMINIER & JAMES A. KRIER, 
PROPERTY 877 n.32 (4th ed. 1998) (same). 
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The 1944 Restatement of Property established a test—rather controversial 
at the time—that was a little more restricted and more definite.  It purported to 
limit “touch and concern” to cases where “the promise will benefit the 
promisee or other beneficiary of the promise in the physical use or enjoyment 
of the land possessed by him.”5  Courts often use similar formulations. 
Sometimes they limit the definition even more, by requiring that the servitude 
affect the parties interests “‘as landowners’, such that the benefits and burdens 
could not exist independent of the parties’ ownership interests in real 
property.”6 
The Restatement (Third) of Property recognizes those difficulties and 
proposes an alternative analysis: whether the restriction is “illegal, 
unconstitutional, or against public policy.”  The latter is judged in a number of 
ways, including whether it is “arbitrary, spiteful, or capricious;” unreasonably 
burdens a constitutional right; is an unreasonable restraint on alienation; is an 
undue restraint on competition; or is unconscionable.7 
The Restatement’s project is admirable—and may win converts in the 
courts.8  However, at this point, courts are still talking about the traditional 
 
 4. See, e.g., Gallagher v. Bell, 516 A.2d 1028, 1033-36 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1986) 
(applying Restatement and concluding that agreement by otherwise landlocked parcel to pay part 
of the cost of paving in exchange for right-of-way touches and concerns the land).  In Gallagher, 
as in so many other cases, there is a mixing of concepts.  In this case there is mixing of an 
easement with a covenant.  Nevertheless, it seems to be a reasonable mixing.  See EDWARD E. 
CHASE, PROPERTY LAW: CASES, MATERIALS, AND QUESTIONS 860-61 (2002) (using Gallagher 
to teach “touch and concern”). 
 5. RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF PROPERTY § 537(a) (1944).  Judge Clark questioned 
whether that section actually defined “touch and concern.”  See CLARK, supra note 2, at 219.  
Judge Clark thought the Restatement departed too much from established cases and that its 
provision requiring a rough proportionality between the benefit conferred by the promise and the 
burden imposed by the promise was a “masquerader” that curried support “by reason of its false 
garb.”  Id.  See RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF PROPERTY § 537(b) (1944). 
 6. JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER, PROPERTY LAW: RULES, POLICIES, AND PRACTICES 461 (2d 
ed. 1997) (quoting Runyon v. Paley, 416 S.E.2d 177, 182-83 (N.C. 1992)). 
 7. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY § 3.1 (1991). 
 8. Courts seem to be embracing the Restatement (Third) of Property in a refreshingly wide 
range of areas.  See, e.g., Roaring Fork Club, L.P. v. St. Jude’s Co., 36 P.3d 1229 (Colo. 2001); 
Lazy Dog Ranch v. Telluray Ranch Corp., 965 P.2d 1229, 1234 (Colo. 2001); Abington Ltd. 
P’ship v. Heublein, 778 A.2d 885, 893 n.24 (Conn. 2001); Schovee v. Mikolasko, 737 A.2d 578, 
586 (Md. 1999).  Courts have relied upon it on the precise issue of whether servitudes run with 
the land. See, e.g., Exit 1 Props. Ltd. P’ship. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 692 N.E.2d 115, 117 (Mass. 
App. Ct. 1998); Beattie v. State ex rel. Grand River Dam Auth., No. 91,359, 2002 WL 49964 
(Okla. Jan. 15, 2002) (concurring opinion); Canyon Meadows Home Owners Ass’n v. Wasatch 
County, No. 20000905-CA, 2001 Utah App. LEXIS 115, at *10 n.5 (Utah Ct. App. Dec. 28, 
2001). 
  Nevertheless, courts are reluctant to abandon the touch and concern test altogether.  See 
Davidson Bros., Inc. v. D. Katz & Sons, Inc., 579 A.2d 288, 293 (N.J. 1990) (explicitly applying 
touch and concern as one of several factors governing whether servitude is reasonable, including 
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requirements of equitable servitudes. This Essay describes several examples I 
use with students when exploring what the “touch and concern” requirement 
means.9  The examples deal with both negative servitudes (restricting the use 
that one can make of property) and affirmative servitudes (imposing some 
affirmative duty on the owner of the burdened property, such as the payment of 
money).  They also explore the distinction between servitudes where the 
benefit is appurtenant (that is, related to a neighboring parcel of land) and 
where the benefit is in gross (unrelated to land), and the seeming requirement 
that the servitude provide a rational benefit to the dominant estate. 
I.  NEGATIVE SERVITUDES 
It is easier to show that the burden of negative servitudes touch and 
concern the land than affirmative servitudes.  Simply put, restrictions on land 
use are easy to construe as directly related to the land.10  In every instance I can 
think of, negative servitudes touch and concern the land they are burdening.  
We are concerned with two sides of an equation: does the burden touch and 
concern the land and does the benefit touch and concern the land?  If there is 
no dominant estate and if the land is burdened, but there is no corresponding 
parcel of land that is benefited, then we say that the benefit is in gross.  If a 
benefit is in gross, the burden will not run.11 
 
then-proposed Restatement test); Sonoma Dev., Inc. v. Miller, 515 S.E.2d 577, 579 (Va. 1999) 
(acknowledging that the Restatement (Third) of Property abandons the horizontal privity 
requirement for covenants to run, while requiring horizontal privity in Virginia). 
 9. Because the requirements for equitable servitudes are substantially lower than real 
covenants, and because a plaintiff is typically interested in some form of injunctive relief, I spend 
relatively little time with students on the arcane requirements of real covenants.  See generally 
JAMES L. WINOKUR ET AL., PROPERTY AND LAWYERING 642-43 (2002).  There are some courts, 
however, that continue to hold plaintiffs to the requirements of real covenants—that there be 
horizontal privity.  See, e.g., Sonoma Dev., 515 S.E.2d at 579; Waynesboro Village v. BMC 
Props., 496 S.E.2d 64, 68 (Va. 1998), cited in SINGER, INTRODUCTION TO PROPERTY, supra note 
1, at 241 n.70.  I find Sonoma difficult to understand, because the plaintiff there was seeking an 
injunction to prevent the defendant from building on the plaintiff’s property. Hence, it appears 
that the court should have applied the requirements for equitable servitudes rather than real 
covenants.  The court gave no rationale for applying real covenant rules.  See Sonoma, 515 S.E. at 
579 (“In the present case, the Millers acknowledge that the ‘Declaration of Restriction’ does not 
fall within the second category of restrictive covenants.”). 
 10. See Sloan v. Johnson, 491 S.E.2d 725, 729 (Va. 1997) (restriction on building touches 
and concerns). 
 11. In the well-known case of Caullett v. Stanley Stilwell & Sons, Inc., 170 A.2d 52, 53 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1961), for example, there was a covenant that required landowners to use a 
particular construction company for building on their lots.  The burden—the restriction that there 
could be building only through one construction company—touched and concerned the burdened 
land.  Id.  The benefit, however, was in gross: there was no parcel of land that benefited from the 
restriction.  Therefore, the burden did not run.  Id. at 56. 
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In rare instances, state statutes abolish the requirement that the servitude 
touch and concern some dominant estate.  Massachusetts, for instance, permits 
conservation servitudes to restrict development on land, even though there is 
no identifiable dominant parcel.12  Yet, for the burden to run to subsequent 
purchasers, the servitude must also touch and concern a dominant parcel.  That 
is, the servitude must touch and concern both the servient estate and the 
dominant estate.  Of course, as many have discussed, touch and concern is a 
stand-in for ambiguous questions about what promises we want to enforce.  
Lawrence Berger phrased the rationale underlying touch and concern in 1970.  
Touch and concern is designed to give: 
effect to the intent that most people would probably have if they thought about 
the issue [of whether the benefit or burden runs] and thereby protec[t] 
subsequent parties against unexpected and unexpectable liability.  Touch and 
concern is a device for intent effectuation, through which the law conforms 
itself to normal, usual or probable understanding of the community.13 
To graph this, let me suggest a couple a very simple case, of a negative 
covenant, where the promisor agrees not to build on her land in a way that 
interferes with her neighbor’s view of a lake.  Both the burden (the restriction 
on building) and the benefit (the view) touch and concern the land. 
NEGATIVE SERVITUDE THAT TOUCHES AND CONCERNS THE LAND 
 Burden Benefit 
Original Parties Will not build in a way 
that obstructs view 
Promisee gets unobstructed view of 
the lake 
Subsequent Purchaser Bound by promise Benefits from promise 
 
To try and see the vagaries of “touch and concern,” I start with a negative 
covenant, based on a South Carolina deed: “No Yankees may occupy Tara-
acre.”14  That anti-Yankee covenant is probably unenforceable—it is an undue 
 
 12. See generally Bennett v. Comm’r of Food and Agric., 576 N.E.2d 1365 (Mass. 1991); 
Gerald Korngold, Privately Held Conservation Servitudes: A Policy Analysis in the Context of In 
Gross Real Covenants and Easements, 63 TEX. L. REV. 433 (1984).  In other instances, courts 
seem willing to relax other requirements of servitudes to uphold conservation servitudes.  See 
generally Nature Conservancy v. Congel, 689 N.Y.S.2d 317 (N.Y. App. Div. 1999) (applying 
third party beneficiary theory to allow non-party to enforce conservation servitude).  Nature 
Conservancy is consistent with a series of decisions that allow non-parties to enforce servitudes 
that were created for their benefit.  See, e.g., Snow v. Van Dam, 197 N.E. 224 (Mass. 1935); 
Zamiarski v. Kozial, 239 N.Y.S.2d 221, 223 (N.Y. App. Div. 1963). 
 13. Lawrence Berger, Integration of the Law of Easements, Real Covenants, and Equitable 
Servitudes, 43 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 337, 362 (1986) (quoting Berger, supra note 3, at 208-09). 
 14. The covenant is described in Yankee Restrictions, ARK. DEMOCRAT-GAZETTE, Feb. 7, 
1998, at A2. 
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restraint on alienation and it violates the Fair Housing Act15 —but I think it 
touches and concerns the burdened land.  It limits the use that one may make 
of land and, therefore, satisfies the usual requirements for a servitude to run 
with the land.  Yet courts also speak of the requirement that the servitude touch 
and concern a dominant parcel.  That is, the servitude must touch and concern 
the servient estate and the dominant estate.  Here I think the dominant estates 
are the neighboring properties, which would have the “benefit” that no 
Yankees would live nearby.  But is that “benefit”—that there are no Yankees 
nearby—a sufficient benefit that we say it touches and concerns the dominant 
estate? 
There seems to be yet one other requirement, which is often lightly passed 
over by courts, that the benefit be reasonable, or something that would be 
considered a benefit to a reasonable person.  That seems to be an important, 
though little-discussed, way of disciplining frivolous servitudes.16  So perhaps 
the anti-Yankees covenant is not enforceable because it does not touch and 
concern the dominant estate in the way that courts require.  It may be better 
classified as a benefit in gross; it is unlikely that reasonable subsequent 
purchasers will care—and hence it does not make sense to continue to enforce. 
 
* * * 
 
Another common servitude is a restriction on architectural modifications of 
structures.  Frequently those restrictions are imposed on historically significant 
 
 15. See Alfred L. Brophy & Shubha Ghosh, Whistling Dixie: The Invalidity and 
Unconstitutionality of Covenants Against Yankees, 10 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 57, 70-71, 88 (1999). 
 16. See, e.g., Caullett v. Stanley Stilwell & Sons, Inc., 170 A.2d 52, 55-56 (N.J. Super. Ct. 
App. Div. 1961) (contending that court will only enforce covenant if it produces a benefit that 
justifies the burden).  This in essence imposes an objective standard for touch and concern: there 
must be a benefit to a reasonable person.  That objective standard is in line with other areas of 
property law, even other areas of equitable servitudes.  See, e.g., Sanborn v. McLean, 206 N.W. 
496, 497 (Mich. 1925) (adopting test of constructive notice to determine whether subsequent 
purchasers had notice of implied restrictions). 
  The question of whether there is a benefit to a reasonable person is reminiscent of  
(though narrower in scope) the analysis of whether a servitude is unenforceable because it is 
unreasonable.  Unreasonableness arises in cases of restrictions on competition, see, e.g., 
Whitinsville Plaza, Inc. v. Kotseas, 390 N.E.2d 243, 246 (Mass. 1979); Davidson Bros., Inc. v. D. 
Katz & Sons, Inc., 579 A.2d 288, 293 (N.J. 1990).  The issue of unreasonableness is also 
addressed in questions of alienability, see, e.g., Kerley v. Nu-West, Inc., 762 P.2d 631, 633 (Ariz. 
Ct. App. 1988).  The Restatement (Third) of Property uses such cases as the basis for its proposed 
reasonableness test.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY § 3.4 (1992) (balancing utility or 
restraint against “injurious consequences” in measuring validity of direct restaints on alienation). 
  There also seems to be a related equal protection principle read into the servitudes by 
some courts.  See, e.g., Petersen v. Beekmere, Inc., 283 A.2d 911, 920-21 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. 
Div. 1971) (refusing to enforce covenant to pay money for upkeep of common areas when 
covenant applies to only some of the beneficiaries of the common area). 
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properties.  Such restrictions, part of a common scheme, touch and concern 
both the servient estate and the surrounding dominant estates, particularly 
when all the estates are bound.17 
But do all architectural restrictions run with the land?  Try this one out.  
What if Frank Lloyd Wright imposes a restriction on a house he designs that 
there may be no architectural modifications made to the inside of the house?18  
What if there are specific clauses that power outlets cannot be added and that 
walls must be painted a certain color?  The restrictions certainly limit the uses 
the servient estate owners may make of their property.  But do they touch and 
concern a dominant parcel or are they in gross?  It is difficult to see how they 
benefit neighboring properties.19  I think that such a servitude would, like the 
anti-Yankee covenant, not run with the land. 
II.  AFFIRMATIVE SERVITUDES20 
If negative covenants are so difficult to analyze, what of affirmative 
covenants?  Courts view with increased suspicion requirements that 
landowners undertake some affirmative duty, rather than merely refraining 
from doing something.  They have viewed with suspicion the requirement that 
homeowners pay money, such as for the upkeep of a country club,21 although 
the modern view is that affirmative servitudes “touch and concern the land if 
the payment is for something that enhances the value of the property, its 
security, or the quality of life on the property.”22  By exploring affirmative 
covenants, we get a fuller exploration of what touch and concern means.   
One wonders whether an agreement to provide water to a neighbor’s land, 
for which the neighbor agreed to pay $35 per year, touches and concerns the 
land?  The New York Court of Appeals held in Eagle Enterprise v. Gross that 
 
 17. Sanborne, 206 N.W. at 496-97. 
 18. See Douglas Martin, Home Sweet Landmark: When Permanent House Guest Is Frank 
Lloyd Wright, NEW YORK TIMES, Aug. 7, 1996, at B1. 
 19. That is different, of course, from outside architectural modifications, which obviously 
touch and concern because the neighboring parcels all have an interest in the appearance of the 
surrounding property. 
 20. Although affirmative servitudes frequently involve the obligation to pay money—and 
thus invoke issues of the whether the requirements of real covenants are satisfied—this Essay 
does not address the requirements of real covenants (such as vertical and horizontal privity) that 
are distinct from those involving equitable servitudes. 
 21. See DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra note 3, at 882-83 (collecting conflicting cases on 
whether requirement that homeowners pay money for athletic facilities touch and concern); 
SHELDON F. KURTZ & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, CASES AND MATERIALS ON AMERICAN 
PROPERTY LAW 679 (2d ed. 1993) (“The overwhelming majority of courts hold that reasonably 
distributed covenant obligations to pay money are enforceable if the money benefits either the 
lots themselves or some facility related to the subdivision, such as community facilities [or] 
country clubs . . . .”). 
 22. KURTZ & HOVENKAMP, supra note 21, at 661. 
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it did not, at least when the people obligated to pay for the water drilled their 
own well.23  Perhaps that case is wrong.  Try flipping the facts around.  Do we 
really believe that the water supplier could get away from the promise to 
provide water?  Does that obligation not touch and concern the land?24  Eagle 
Enterprise did not raise this possibility. However, it may be that the agreement 
did not touch and concern the land after the well was drilled, because there was 
no benefit to the water supply.25 
For example, try this covenant out, taken from The Great Gatsby.  The 
man who built Gatsby’s house was rumored to have offered to pay the taxes of 
the surrounding houses for five years if they would thatch their roofs.26  That 
would have made their property look like peasant cottages and his house, by 
comparison, like a manor house.  The neighbors did not take him up on the 
offer, for “Americans, while willing, even eager, to be serfs, have always been 
obstinate about being peasantry.”27 
And so, while we are deprived of an example of such a servitude, because 
of the independence of the neighbors, I wonder whether such a servitude would 
run with the land?28  There are affirmative promises going both ways: the 
neighbors agree to thatch their roofs and the owner of the “manor house” 
agrees to pay the taxes. 
Now let’s try a somewhat more outrageous example.  Suppose Gatsby’s 
predecessor did not want the continuing burden of paying taxes, so he offers to 
sell the property at a reduced rate up front and in return extracts a promise (an 
affirmative covenant) that whenever people appear on the property outside of 
the house they will wear peasant clothes.  Does that affirmative covenant touch 
and concern the land?  To make it look even more like a feudal incident, 
suppose they must appear on the first day of June and pay homage to the owner 
of the manor house?  Such servitudes certainly affect people in their use of the 
property, but perhaps they provide an insufficient current benefit to 
landholders for us to say that the servitude touches and concerns the land. 
 
 23. 349 N.E.2d 816, 820 (N.Y. 1976). 
 24. Nicholson v. 300 Broadway Realty Corp., 164 N.E.2d 832, 835-36 (N.Y. 1959) (stating 
in dicta that agreement to provide steam heat ran with the land, though imposing liability to 
provide steam through contract, rather than property, rationale). 
 25. See supra note 16 (discussing requirement that for servitude to touch and concern there 
must be a benefit to a reasonable person, which presumably is not present when the water is no 
longer needed); DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra note 3, at 884 (fitting Eagle Enterprise into a 
framework of servitudes that become unenforceable because of subsequent events).  Kurtz and 
Hovenkamp suggest that the availability of an alternative source of water was important, though 
they do not provide a rationale why.  KURTZ & HOVENKAMP, supra note 21, at 678. 
 26. F. SCOTT FITZGERALD, THE GREAT GATSBY 70 (Oxford University Press ed., 1998). 
 27. Id. 
 28. In this case, if the neighbors sought enforcement of the agreement to pay taxes, the 
servitude might have to follow the rules of restrictive covenants.  The covenant would, obviously, 
bind the original parties. 
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III.  THINKING ABOUT SERVITUDES THAT RUN WITH THE LAND 
Even a cursory discussion of the vagaries of servitudes suggests why the 
Restatement (Third) of Property has such appeal: it offers the hope of a fairly 
straightforward approach to determining when promises regarding land use 
will be enforced against subsequent purchasers of property.  However, there 
are some key considerations that students can identify as they struggle with 
servitudes.  First, negative covenants are more likely than affirmative 
covenants to touch and concern the land.  They always, so far as I can tell, 
touch and concern the servient estate.  They usually touch and concern a 
dominant estate, although in some instances there may not be an identifiable 
dominant estate or the promise may be so outrageous that it fails to touch and 
concern because there is no rational benefit from it. 
Affirmative covenants will touch and concern when they impose an 
obligation closely related to the use and enjoyment of land.  But figuring out 
when and how closely related the obligation is to the use and enjoyment of 
land will continue to require courts, and students, to struggle.  They will also, it 
seems, use that vague construct to invalidate oppressive servitudes. 
 
